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Abstract: Theoretical models of critical mass have shown how minority groups can initiate social 
change dynamics in the emergence of new social conventions.  Here we study an artificial system 
of social conventions in which human subjects interact to establish a new coordination equilibrium.  
The findings provide direct empirical demonstration of the existence of a tipping point in the 
dynamics of changing social conventions.  When minority groups reached the critical mass –that 
is, the critical group size for initiating social change –they were consistently able to overturn the 
established behavior.  The size of the required critical mass is expected to vary based on 
theoretically identifiable features of a social setting.  Our results show that the theoretically 
predicted dynamics of critical mass do in fact emerge as expected within an empirical system of 
social coordination. 
 
Observational accounts of rapid changes in social conventions have suggested that apparently 
stable societal norms can be effectively overturned by the efforts of small but committed minorities 
(1–3).  From social expectations about gender roles in the workplace (4), to the popular acceptance 
of (or intolerance toward) tobacco use and marijuana use (5), accounts of changing social 
conventions have hypothesized that minority groups can trigger a shift in the conventions held by  
the majority of the population  (1–3, 5, 6).  While this hypothesis presents a striking contrast to the 
expectations of classical equilibrium stability analysis from economic theory (7,8), it can 
nevertheless be well-explained by the theory of critical mass as posited by evolutionary game 
theory (9–11).  This theory argues that when a committed minority reaches a critical group size –
commonly referred to as a “critical mass” – the social system crosses a tipping point.  Once the 
tipping point is reached, the actions of a minority group trigger a cascade of behavior change that 
rapidly increases the acceptance of a minority view (12–14). 
The simplest formulation of critical mass theory maintains that small groups of regular 
individuals –that is, with the same amount of social power and resources as everyone else –can 
successfully initiate a change in social conventions.  According to this view, the power of small 
groups comes not from their authority or wealth but from their commitment to the cause (14, 15).  
Thus far, evidence for critical mass dynamics in changing social conventions has been 
limited to formal theoretical models, and observations from qualitative studies.  These studies have 
proposed a wide range of possible thresholds for the size of an effective critical mass, ranging from 
10% of the population up to 40%.   For instance, theoretical simulations of linguistic conventions 
have argued that a critical mass composed of 10% of the population is sufficient to overturn an 
established social equilibrium (14).  By contrast, qualitative studies of gender conventions in 
corporate leadership roles have hypothesized that tipping points are only likely to emerge when a 
critical mass of 30% of the population is reached (3, 16).  Related observational work on gender 
conventions (17) has built on this line of research, speculating that effective critical mass sizes are 
likely to be even higher, approaching 40% of the population. Despite the broad practical (18, 19) 
and scientific (1, 12) importance of understanding the dynamics of critical mass in collective 
behavior, it has not been possible to identify whether there are in fact tipping points in empirical 
systems because such a test requires the ability to independently vary the size of minority groups 
within an evolving system of social coordination. 
We addressed this problem by adopting an experimental approach to studying tipping 
point dynamics within an artificially created system of evolving social conventions. Following 
the literature on social conventions (9, 20, 21), we study a system of coordination in which a 
minority group of actors attempt to disrupt an established equilibrium behavior.  In both our 
theoretical framework and empirical setting, we adopt the canonical approach of using 
coordination on a naming convention as a general model for conventional behavior (21–24).  Our 
experimental approach is designed to test a broad range of theoretical predictions derived from 
the existing literature on critical mass dynamics in social conventions.   
We first synthesized these diverse theoretical and observational accounts of tipping point 
dynamics to derive theoretical predictions for the size of an effective critical mass (25).  Based on 
earlier theoretical (9, 26) and qualitative studies of social convention (20, 23), we propose a simple 
model of strategic choice in which actors decide which social conventions to follow by choosing 
the option that yields the greatest expected individual reward given their history of social 
interactions (9).  In this individual learning model, people coordinate with their peers so long as 
they benefit individually from coordinating.  The model predicts a sharp transition in the collective 
dynamics of social convention as the size of the committed minority reaches a critical fraction of 
the population (Fig. 1).  When the size of the committed minority is below this predicted tipping 
point, the dominant social convention is expected to remain stable, while above this size it is 
expected to change (25). 
Our theoretical predictions for the size of the critical mass were determined by two 
parameters: individual memory length (M), and population size (N).  Explorations of these 
parameters (Fig. 1) show that the predicted size of the tipping point changes significantly with 
individuals’ expected memory length (M).  When participants have shorter memories (M <5 
interactions), the size of the critical mass is smaller.  Even under the assumption that people have 
very long memories (M >100 interactions), the predicted critical mass size remains well below 
50% of the population (25), indicating that critical mass dynamics may be possible even in systems 
with long histories. Variations in population size were explored computationally in the range 
20<N<100,000 and were not found to significantly affect the predicted critical mass size (25).  
Figure 1 shows that for populations in the range 20<N<1000 stochastic fluctuations introduce a 
small uncertainty into the estimate of the critical mass size.  However, for population sizes 
N>1000, the predicted tipping point for social change is constant and independent of N (complete 
details in (25)). 
We recruited 194 subjects from the World Wide Web, and placed them into online 
communities where they participated in a social coordination process (27, 28).  Upon arrival to the 
study, participants were randomly assigned to participate in one of 10 independent online groups, 
which varied in size from 20 to 30 people.  In a given round of the study, two members of each 
group were chosen at random to interact with one another. Both subjects simultaneously assigned 
names to a pictured object (i.e., a face), attempting to coordinate in the real-time exchange of 
linguistic alternatives (20, 25). If the players entered the same name (i.e., coordinated), they were 
rewarded with a successful payment; if they entered different names (i.e., failed to coordinate), 
they were penalized.  In each community, individuals interacted with each other over repeated 
rounds of randomly assigned pairings, with the goal of coordinating with one another (25).  
Participants were not incentivized to reach a “global” consensus, but only to coordinate in a 
pairwise fashion with their partner on each round.  Participants were financially rewarded for 
coordinating, and financially punished each time they failed to coordinate with each other (25).  
Once a convention was established for the entire population, the incentives strongly favored 
coordinating on the equilibrium behavior. 
After each round, the participants could see only the choices that they and their partner had 
made, and their cumulative pay was updated accordingly. They were then randomly assigned to 
interact with a new member of their group, and a new round would begin.  These dynamics reflect 
common types of online exchanges, in which community members directly interact the other 
members of a large, often anonymous population –using, for instance, chat interfaces or messaging 
technologies –leading them to adopt linguistic and behavioral conventions that allow them to 
effectively coordinate their actions with other participants’ expectations (20, 29, 30).  Consistent 
with these types of settings, participants in the study did not have any information about the size 
of the population that was attempting to coordinate nor about the number of individuals to whom 
they were connected (9, 20, 23).  In every group, this interaction process quickly led to the 
establishment of a group-wide social convention, in which all players in the network consistently 
coordinated on the same naming behavior (20, 25).  Once a convention was established among all 
experimental participants, we introduced a small number of confederates (that is, a “committed 
minority”) into each group, who attempted to overturn the established convention by advancing a 
novel alternative (25). 
Trials varied according to the size of the committed minority (C) that attempted to overturn 
the established convention.  In total, we studied the dynamics of critical mass in 10 independent 
groups, each with a committed minority of a fixed size.  Across all 10 groups, the sizes of the 
committed minorities were in the range (15% < C < 35%).  
Figures 2 and 3 report tipping point dynamics in the collective process of overturning an 
established equilibrium.  Consistent with the expectations of our theoretical model (using 
empirically parameterized values of N and M), when the size of the committed minority reached 
approximately 25% of the population, a tipping point was triggered, and the minority group 
succeeded in changing the established social convention.  
Five trials were conducted.  Each trial was composed of two communities –one with the 
committed minority below the expected critical size (C < 25%), and one with it above (C > 25%).  
In every trial, the community with C < 25% had only small numbers of converts to the minority 
view.  Over the course of these trials, each of these converts eventually reverted back to the 
dominant norm.  Continuous interactions led to occasional switching by subjects throughout the 
study.  However, over all of the trials, in the condition where the minority group was smaller than 
25% of the population, on average only 6% of the non-committed population adopted the 
alternative behavior by the final round of the study. 
For each of these unsuccessful trials, we conducted a corresponding trial using another 
population of the same size, but with a larger committed minority (25% ≤  𝐶 ≤ 31%).  In all of 
these groups, the alternative norm reached the majority of the population within the experimental 
window of observation (Figures 2 and 3).  Over all trials, populations with 𝐶 ≥ 25% were 
significantly more likely to overturn the dominant convention than populations with a committed 
minority below 25% (P=.01, Wilcoxon rank sum).  We found that in one case (Trial 1) this 
transition from failure to success was the result of increasing the size of the committed minority 
by only one person.   
Figure 3 shows a summary of final adoption levels across all trials, along with expectations 
from our empirically parameterized theoretical model, with 95% confidence intervals.  Populations 
with committed minorities ranging from 25% ≤ 𝐶 ≤ 27% achieved uptake levels between 72% 
and 100% within the empirical observation window.  At C=31%, the committed minority achieved 
consensus within the window of empirical observation.  Figure 3 compares these observations to 
numerical simulations of the theoretical model using population sizes and observation windows 
comparable to the experimental study (N=24, T=100, M=12).  Memory length for these simulations 
was calibrated using subjects’ empirical memory lengths in this study based on their observed 
behavior over all 10 groups.  A memory length in the range 9 ≤ 𝑀 ≤ 13 provides a good 
approximation of subjects’ observed behavior, correctly predicting 80% of subjects’ choices across 
all trials (25).   The theoretically predicted critical mass size from this model fit the experimental 
findings well (Fig. 3).  Numerical analyses indicate that with larger population sizes the critical 
mass point becomes more exact (See Fig. 1 and Fig. 3), approaching 24.3% of the population. 
Our experimental results do not show agreement with theoretical predictions from models 
of social convention that predict low critical mass thresholds, at 10% of the population.  However, 
our findings show good agreement with qualitative studies of gender conventions within 
organizational settings (3), which hypothesized that a critical mass of approximately 30% could 
be sufficient to overturn established norms (16).  Our results may suggest that in organizational 
contexts –where population boundaries are relatively well-defined, and there are clear expectations 
and rewards for social coordination among peers –the process of normative changes in social 
conventions may be well-described by the dynamics of critical mass.  
The design choices that aided our control of the study also put constraints on the behaviors 
that we could test.  Our experimental design provided subjects with social and financial incentives 
that strongly favored coordinating on an established social convention (25).  However, in the real 
world, individuals’ emotional and psychological commitments to established behaviors can create 
additional resistance to behavior change (31).  To further explore these expectations, 
supplementary analyses of our theoretical model (Fig. S7) (25) extend our basic predictions to 
consider how the critical mass size may differ under conditions of greater social entrenchment.  
When actors are more conservative –exhibiting an explicit bias in favor of the established 
convention (based on a skewed best response calculation favoring the equilibrium behavior) –
tipping point dynamics were still predicted to be achievable by committed minorities with only 
marginally larger group sizes. 
In delimiting the scope of our findings, we emphasize that the critical mass value of 25% 
is not expected to be a universal value for changing social conventions.  Our results demonstrate 
that within an endogenous system of social coordination, tipping point dynamics emerged 
consistent with theoretical expectations.  Further work is required to determine the applicability of 
our findings to specific social settings.  In particular, alternative empirical parameterizations of 
our model can result in alternative predictions for the expected size of the critical mass.  We expect 
that the findings from our study can be significantly expanded by future empirical work studying 
the dynamics of tipping points within other empirical systems of social convention. 
For instance, an important setting in which these results might be usefully applied concerns 
the growing ability of organizations and governments to use confederate actors within online 
spaces to influence conventional behaviors and beliefs.  Recent work on the 50c party in China 
(32, 33) has argued that the Chinese government has incentivized small groups of motivated 
individuals to anonymously infiltrate social media communities such as Weibo with the intention 
of subtly shifting the tone of the collective dialogue to focus on topics that celebrate national pride, 
and distract from collective grievances (32).  We anticipate that social media spaces of this kind 
will be an increasingly important setting for extending the findings of our study to understand the 
role of committed minorities in shifting social conventions.  Similarly, the results from our study 
may also be usefully applied to the dynamics of critical mass in other online settings, such as 
changing social expectations regarding i) the standards of civility in Facebook and other online 
discussion forums (19, 34), ii) the acceptability of bullying behavior in adolescent chat groups 
(35), and iii)  the appropriate kinds of content to share with strangers over social media (36), all of 
which have been suggested to exhibit susceptibility to shifts in conventional behavior as a result 
of the activity of a small fraction of the population (19, 34, 36). 
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Fig. 1.  Predicted tipping points in social stability.  A) Theoretical modeling of the proportion 
of outcomes in which the alternative behavior is adopted by 100% of the population.  In this 
system, the number of agents (N)=1000, the number of interactions (T)=1000, the number of past 
interactions used in agent decisions (M)=12).  B) The size of the predicted critical mass point is 
shown as a function of individuals’ average memory length, M, where (N=1000, T=1000).  The 
dashed lines indicate the range enclosed by our experimental trials, showing the largest 
unsuccessful minority (21%) and the smallest successful minority (25%).  Although the expected 
size of the critical mass point increases with M, this relationship is concave, allowing the predicted 
tipping point to remain well below 50% as M gets large (>100).  Inset Effect of increasing 
population size on the precision of the size of the committed minority (C) prediction (M=12, 
T=1000).  For N<1000, small variations in the predicted tipping point emerge due to stochastic 
variations in individual behavior.  Shaded region indicates C sizes where success was observed 
frequently, but without certainty.  Above this region, for larger C sizes, the probability of success 
reaches 1; for C sizes below this region, the likelihood of success goes to 0.   
 
  
 
Fig. 2.  Time series showing adoption of the alternative convention by non-committed subjects 
(i.e., experimental subjects).  Gray line indicates the popularity of the established convention and 
black line shows the adoption of the alternative convention.  Success was achieved when more 
than 50% of the non-committed population adopted the new social convention. Trials in the left 
column show failed mobilization, while trials in the right column show successful mobilization.  
A transition in the collective dynamics happens when C reaches approximately 25% of the 
population.  Each round is measured as N/2 pairwise interactions, such that each player has one 
interaction per round on average.  
  
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Final success levels from all trials (gray points indicate trials with C < 25%; black points 
indicate trials with 𝐶 ≥ 25%).  Also shown is the theoretically predicted critical mass point (solid 
line) with 95% confidence intervals (N=24, T=45, M=12; gray area indicates 95% confidence 
intervals from 1,000 replications).  The dotted line indicates C=25%.  The theoretical model of 
critical mass provides a good approximation of the empirical findings.  For short time periods 
(T<100), the critical mass point prediction is not exact (ranging from 20% < C < 30% of the 
population); however over longer time periods (T > 1000) the transition dynamics become more 
precise (solid line, SOM).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Supplementary Materials 
Materials and Methods 
Experimental Design 
Subjects were randomly assigned to a fully-connected network (i.e., homogeneously 
mixing population) containing a pre-determined number of experimental participants and 
confederates.  The number of confederates as a fraction of the total population was varied between 
conditions.  Our theoretical model predicts a tipping point with approximately 25% of the 
population.  To test this effect, we ran 5 trials with fewer than 25% confederates (“below 
threshold”) and five trials with greater than 25% confederates (“above threshold”).  Because users 
had no way of distinguishing confederates from experimental participants, the user experience in 
below-threshold conditions was identical to the user experience in above-threshold conditions. 
Experimental trials consisted of two phases.  Once a trial began, the first phase of the 
experimental procedure (see “Subject Experience During the Experiment” below) allowed subjects 
to interact until they established a shared social convention.  This phase used the procedures from  
previous research on the emergence of conventions (20).  During this phase, confederate 
participants entered no response, except during trials 3 and 4, in which they played a single pre-
determined strategy during phase one to speed up initial convergence.  Phase one was considered 
complete when every experimental participant began using the same strategy, with at most two 
players deviating.  This determination was based on previous experimental methods for identifying 
convergence on social conventions (20), which indicated that even once a stable convention is 
established, not all players will always use the conventional strategy. 
 Once an endogenous convention was reached, the confederate participants simultaneously 
began entering a pre-determined response that differed from the established convention.  All the 
confederates used the same response.  In order to ensure that the alternative response was 
comparable to the established convention, we used responses selected from names that commonly 
emerged as conventions in previous studies (e.g., “Mary”).  Confederate participants continued 
entering this alternative strategy until the game was complete.   
The length of an entire experimental trial was determined prior to play beginning.  Due to 
stochastic variation in the length of the first experimental phase, consistent with previous research 
on the emergence of conventions (20), the number of interactions available for Phase 2 varied 
between trials.  The number of interactions also varied because subjects entered responses at 
different rates, and the trials were run until each player participated in a minimum number of 
interactions. 
 
Subject Recruitment 
Participants in our study were recruited via the World Wide Web to be players in online 
games for research purposes.  Players registered by providing their email address and selecting a 
username and an avatar.  All players were required to provide informed consent in order to register.  
Once registered, users were placed into a recruitment pool for future experiments.  Registered 
users were then sent an advertisement and a link to participate in a trial for this study.  Trials were 
run over a 105 day period between July 15, 2015, and October 7, 2015. 
 
Subject Experience During the Experiment 
 Upon arriving at the study website, participants viewed instructions on how to play the 
game (Figure S1).   In the game, participants play a series of one-shot coordination games, as 
shown in Figure S2.  The left hand column shows the other players in the game.  However, they 
have no information about which player (“partner”) they are matched with for a given interaction.  
Participants cannot identify whether they are matched with another experimental participant or a 
confederate.  They cannot identify if their partner for a given interaction is the same as their partner 
in a previous interaction. 
 For each one-shot game, participants are shown an image (a picture of a man or a woman) 
and prompted to enter a name in the response field.  There is one picture per trial—i.e., the picture 
does not change across interactions and remains the same for all the interactions within the same 
experimental trial. Participants are instructed that if they enter the same name as their partner, they 
will be rewarded $0.10.  If they do not enter the same name as their partner, $0.10 is deducted 
from their total winnings, with a minimum possible reward of $0.00.  On the right hand side, 
participants are shown their progress in the game.  Completed interactions indicate whether the 
interaction was a match.  After each interaction, participants are shown the name entered by their 
partner, regardless of whether or not it was a match.  Centola & Baronchelli (20) showed that by 
this process, subjects will successfully establish a shared convention; i.e., this process leads 
subjects to converge on a single shared name for the person depicted in the image.  
 
Supplementary Text 
Model Definition 
Our theoretical model follows previous theoretical models of critical mass in studying 
asynchronous pairwise interaction (14,26).  However, while these prior models assume that agents 
randomly select from previously observed strategies, we follow game theoretic models of 
convention (9) in modeling strategic choice in which individuals attempt to choose the behavior 
most likely to generate successful coordination.   
In each time step, two agents from a population of N agents are randomly selected to 
interact.  One agent is randomly selected to be the “speaker” and the other agent is assigned the 
role of “hearer.”  The agent playing the role of speaker picks a best response strategy.  The best 
response strategy is defined as the strategy most frequently observed in previous interactions in 
which that agent was the hearer.  An agent’s “memory” stores a record of the strategies observed 
in use by other players, and an agent only updates their memory during interactions in which they 
are the hearer.  Agents do not respond to a complete history of past plays; rather, we assume that 
agents determine their best response strategy based only on the past M interactions.  The agent 
decision rule is therefore defined by the single parameter M that determines the size of an agent’s 
memory.  This limit reflects both the assumption that agents have limited cognitive resources and 
also the assumption that recent interactions are more informative of population behavior (9). 
The formalization of memory as a sliding window within a vector of past plays was chosen 
in order both to be consistent with previous theoretical research in evolutionary game theory (9) 
and also to maintain a parsimonious model with minimal degrees of freedom.  Other possible 
formalizations for memory include a continuous decay model.  This model was not selected for 
this study because it would involve more degrees of freedom to specify a decay function and 
associated parameters.  As a simple approximation, we find that a sliding window formalization 
correctly predicts approximately 80% of user plays.  Thus far, we have not found that any 
alternative model provides a better fit with the empirical data. 
Following a standard procedure from the literature (14), we model a scenario in which a 
population has already converged on some convention, so that every agent uses some previously 
established strategy ‘A’, such that A is the only option contained in each agent’s memory.  The 
simulation is therefore initialized so that every non-committed agent has a memory that contains 
only A (i.e., each non-committed agent begins the simulation with a memory as if they had 
observed A for the previous M interactions).  Our simulation studies the dynamics that occur when 
some fraction of that population begins to use an alternative strategy ‘B’ instead of following best-
response dynamics.  This committed minority always uses a single fixed strategy B when they are 
selected as speaker instead of using a best response strategy.  Thus, we simulate the effect of a 
committed minority using strategy B in a population with an established convention A.  With the 
exception of the decision heuristic used by non-committed agents, our model is identical to that 
studied by Xie et al. (14), which is itself identical to Baronchelli et al. (26).  The best-response 
decision-rule for non-committed agents is identical to that studied by Young (9). 
We consider a population of N agents.  Some fraction C of the total N agents are identified 
as committed agents who always play B.  At time T=0, the agents playing best-response dynamics 
(i.e., non-committed agents) are initialized with a memory vector of length M, the entries of which 
are all A.  The model is fully defined by the following parameters: 
• N:  the number of agents 
• C:  the fraction of the population belonging to the committed group 
• M:  the number of past interactions used in agent decisions 
This model defines a Markov chain with only one absorbing state: the state in which the 
entire population has adopted the strategy promoted by the committed minority.  However, this 
will only occur in infinite time when the committed minority is small (14).  In finite time, the 
model is characterized by two states.  Above the tipping point, the alternative strategy promoted 
by the committed minority is very quickly adopted by the entire population.  Below the tipping 
point, the model reaches a quasi-stationary state in which the initial convention is the dominant 
convention for very long periods of time (14). 
 We therefore measure the tipping point in simulation by simulating T=1000*N interactions  
(i.e., to allow an average of 1000 interactions per agent) and then calculating the percentage of 
non-committed agents who have adopted the alternative strategy. Results are only minimally 
perturbed by larger values of T. 
 
Estimating Memory Length 
 To develop our experimental hypotheses, we used data from previous experiments on the 
same web platform (20) to estimate the value for M by determining the value for which the model 
most accurately predicts user behavior.  We then replicated this analysis for experimental data 
from this study, producing comparable results.  Figure S3 shows the fraction of user choices which 
are accurately predicted by the model as a function of M.  To generate this figure, each user’s play 
was predicted for each interaction based on their M previous observations.  We then plot the total 
fraction of interactions which were correctly predicted for each value of M.  Using this parameter 
estimation, we predict a lower bound of M=12 for users in our experimental platform.  Our 
analyses indicate that there is no reason to think that the participants in our study had longer/shorter 
memories than anyone else in the general population.  To test this, we compared the best-fit 
memory length estimate for the subjects from earlier studies of naming conventions to the best-fit 
memory length estimate for the subjects in this study, and we found no significant differences 
between subject behavior in past studies and subject behavior in the present study. 
 
Tipping Point 
 Coordination dynamics show a tipping point similar to that observed by Xie et al. (14) even 
after accounting for strategic choice.  Using the lower bound estimate M=12, we model short term 
and long term success of committed groups using strategy B in a population playing A, across a 
range of committed minority sizes C and population sizes N.  Figure S4 shows adoption by non-
committed agents after T=45, T=100, and T=1000 “rounds” in a population of N=1,000 agents.   
To normalize time across variation in population size, each time step (“round”) is measured as N 
interactions, or one interaction per agent.  To generate this figure, we initialize the simulation as 
described above and run for N*T interactions (i.e., T rounds).  We measure adoption as the usage 
of each strategy in the N interactions prior to measurement.  We then plot the fraction of non-
committed players adopting the alternative strategy after T interactions for each value of C. 
 Long term adoption at T=1000 rounds shows a sharp transition when committed groups 
reach approximately 24.2% of the population.  Below this threshold, only a small number of non-
committed agents use strategy B in the N interactions prior to measurement.   Above this threshold, 
the population reaches an absorbing state in which all agents are consistently using strategy B. 
For extremely short term dynamics, committed minorities above the tipping point do not 
always achieve full convergence on the alternative strategy.  For N=1,000, for example, after 20 
rounds (Fig S4, light blue line), full convergence is not reached even with C=50%.  After 45 rounds 
(the average length of experimental trials), most above-threshold groups are successful, while 
committed groups between 25% and 30% are not yet guaranteed to reach convergence.  After 100 
rounds, nearly every above-threshold group has achieved widespread adoption.  
 
Robustness to Population Size 
 The tipping point is robust to variation in population size.  To generate figure 1B inset 
(main text) we run the same analysis shown in Figure S4, but with varying population size.  For 
each population size and each value of C, we measure the percentage of simulations that reach 
complete convergence – i.e., the percentage of outcomes in which 100% of the non-committed 
population has adopted the alternative strategy after 1,000 interactions per person.   
The grey area in Figure 1B inset (main text) shows values of C and N for which the 
committed minority is successful (i.e., they achieve full adoption of the alternative strategy) in 
greater than 1% of simulations, but in fewer than 99% of simulations.  That is, for values of C and 
N that fall below this area, the minority group never succeeds in changing the social convention, 
while for values of C that fall above this area the minority group is successful more than 99% of 
the time.    
 For small population sizes, the tipping point has the appearance of non-monotonicity with 
N due to the fact that not all fractions can be converted into a discrete critical mass size:  for 
example, when N=20, a committed group can comprise either 20% (4/20) or 25% (5/20) of the 
population.  Thus, if the tipping point is between 20% and 25%, then it will take a minimum of 
25% (5/20) committed individuals to overturn an established norm.   For population sizes from 
1000 to 100,000 the tipping point stabilizes at a value of 24.2%. 
 
Effect of Memory Parameter 
 The existence of a tipping point is robust to variation in agent memory length, and a tipping 
point in long term adoption appears for all values of M.  Figure 1B (main text) and Figure S5 show 
the tipping point as a function of M.  To generate these figures, we identify the lowest value for C 
in which at least 99% simulations reach convergence (i.e., achieve full adoption of the alternative 
strategy) after N*1000 interactions.  As shown in Fig S3 a group larger than 10% required even if 
agents choose their strategy only based on the previous 4 interactions.  The tipping point remains 
below 50% even for very large values of M, with a critical mass of only 40% required when 
M=100. 
 
Robustness to Network Density 
 Our experimental platform studies critical mass dynamics in a homogeneously mixing 
(fully connected) network, so that any two agents are equally likely to interact.  Dynamics are 
qualitatively similar with sparse random networks, as shown in figure S6.  To generate this figure, 
we generated random networks in which each node has an equal number of connections (37).  In 
sparse networks, the model is defined identically, but instead of uniformly selecting two agents for 
interaction, the model randomly selects an edge from the network for interaction.  One node is 
then selected as speaker, and one node is then selected as hearer.   
 Consistent with findings in (14), the tipping point is slightly lower in sparse networks.  To 
generate Figure S6, we run analyses as shown in Figure 4 at varying network densities.  At each 
point, we determine the smallest value for C at which 100% adoption of the alternative strategy is 
achieved in at least 99% of simulated outcomes.  We hold network size constant, and therefore 
network density is determined by average degree (number of network neighbors) for each node.   
 
Robustness to Agent Strategy Preference 
Our experimental design and theoretical model both reflect coordination dynamics in 
which two agents must decide between two possible strategies, both of which are equally preferred 
by every non-committed individual in the population.  To model the possibility that agents may 
prefer one strategy over another strategy, we adopt the standard game theoretic formalization of 
coordination games in which each strategy is assigned a numeric payoff.  In our base model, both 
strategies would be assigned the same payoff since they are equally preferred. 
 To choose a strategy based on numeric payoff, agents select the strategy with the greatest 
“expected payoff,” which is calculated as the probability of success multiplied by the numeric 
payoff of a successful interaction.  In our computational model of coordination, probability of 
success is determined by the percentage of recent interactions (where recent is defined by memory 
length M) in which a particular strategy was observed.  For example, if strategy A provides a 
payoff of 1 and was observed in 60% of the previous M interactions, and strategy B provides a 
payoff of 2 and was observed in 40% of the previous M actions, then the payoff for each strategy 
is calculated as follows: 
 
 payoff of strategy B  = 0.6 x 1 
= 0.6 
 
 payoff of strategy A  = 0.4 x 2  
= 0.8 
 
Thus, strategy A offers a higher expected payoff despite being less frequently observed and 
offering a lower probability of success.   
 We use this model of agent preference to test whether we observe critical mass dynamics 
in situations where agents have a bias towards either the entrenched convention or the alternative 
strategy.  Figure S7 shows the effect of agent preference on adoption dynamics as a function of 
the relative preference for the established convention, which is measured as the ratio between the 
payoff for the established convention and the alternative strategy.  This figure indicates that even 
when agents prefer the established convention twice as much as the alternative strategy (i.e., the 
payoff ratio between the established convention and the alternative strategy equals 2:1) a 
committed minority can still establish critical mass and achieve widespread adoption of the 
alternative strategy.  
 
Data Availability 
The complete dataset is publicly available for download from the following URL: 
http://ndg.asc.upenn.edu/experiments/creating-critical-mass/ 
 
This dataset contains a time series for each trial starting at phase 2 as described in Materials and 
Methods.  Each row indicates the percentage of responses which are the established convention, 
the percentage of responses which are the alternative strategy, and the percentage of responses 
which are any other strategy.  
 
 
Figure S1.  Screenshot of the waiting page showing instructions. 
  
  
 
Figure S2.  Screenshot of game interface.   Note that what is called a “round” in the user interface 
is a single “interaction” as discussed throughout this text. 
  
 
Figure S3.  Estimating Memory Length from Empirical Data.  Each panel shows the fraction 
of interactions successfully predicted in the data from the current experiment.  When memory 
length is greater than 10, our model correctly predicts 80% of the choices by our experimental 
subjects.   
  
 
Figure S4.  Estimating the Tipping Point.  Each line shows the proportion of simulations in 
which every agent adopted the alternative strategy after T interactions per agent for a network of 
N=1,000 agents as a function of C.  When T=1000, there is a sharp threshold between C=0.241 
and C=0.242 indicating that a small change in the size of a committed minority can generate a 
dramatic shift in the adoption of an alternative convention.  It is worth noting that the threshold is 
well defined only over long time-scales. For shorter time periods, committed minorities that are 
sufficient in long term dynamics may have not yet achieved convergence. 
  
Figure S5.  Critical mass dynamics are robust to variation in agent memory length.  Each 
point in this figure shows the tipping point as a function of agent memory length (M).  Even when 
M=100, the tipping point is well below 50%.  Horizontal lines indicate the largest value for C 
which failed in experimental trials (C=21%, dashed line) and the smallest value for C which 
succeeded in experimental trials (C=25%, dotted line) suggesting that M is between 9% and 13%. 
 
 
 
  
   
  
Figure S6.  The tipping point is robust to changes in network density.  Each point in this figure 
shows the tipping point as a function of network density for simulations with M=12, T=1000*N, 
N=1000.  In very sparse networks where agents only have a few network neighbors, the tipping 
point drops slightly but remains above 20%.  The point furthest to the left shows simulations for 
populations where agents have 10 network neighbors, producing a network density of 1%.   
Network density is defined to be the number of connected edges in a network as a percent of all 
possible edges that could be connected. 
 
  
 
 
  
  
Figure S7.  Critical mass threshold as a function of relative preference.  This figure shows the 
proportion of simulations in which the alternative norm is adopted, as a function of minority size 
and relative preference for each convention for simulations with M=12, N=1000, T=1000*N.  The 
Y axis of this figure indicates the relative payoff of the established convention as compared with 
the alternative strategy.  When the payoff ratio is equal to 1, both strategies are equally desirable 
(i.e., agents simply adopt the most popularly used strategy) and this model is equivalent to our 
general model of conventions, showing a tipping point of approximately 25%.  When the payoff 
ratio is equal to 2, agents prefer the established convention twice as much as the alternative 
strategy, but a committed minority can nonetheless overturn the established convention.  When the 
payoff ratio is equal to 0.5, agents prefer the established convention half as much as the alternative 
strategy (i.e., they prefer the alternative strategy twice as much as the established convention) and 
the critical mass can be reached with a very small committed minority comprising less than 10% 
of the population. 
 
 
 
